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11. Introduction
At least since the work of Sonnenschein, Debreu and Mantel, it is well known that the
utility maximization hypothesis imposes little structure on the excess demand function of
an exchange economy. If all agents have continuous and locally non-satiated preferences then
the economy’s aggregate excess demand will satisfy continuity and Walras’ law, but beyond
that, little can be said. More speciﬁcally, if an agent’s individual excess demand function is
derived from utility maximization, it will satisfy strong structural properties like the weak
and strong axioms, but aggregate excess demand need not have those properties, even if all
agents in the economy are utility-maximizing. This is unfortunate, because it is well known
that an economy with an excess demand function which obeys the weak axiom is very well
behaved. Such an economy will have a unique equilibrium price vector which is stable with
respect to Walras’ tatonnement and, furthermore, one can obtain intuitive comparative
statics results when preferences or endowments are perturbed.1 An economy with an excess
demand function obeying the weak axiom need not admit a utility maximizing representative
consumer, but such a structural property does go some way towards justifying this widely
made assumption. For all these reasons and more, it is important to ﬁnd plausible conditions
on agents’ preferences and/or endowments which will guarantee that the economy’s excess
demand function obeys the weak axiom or some other desirable structural property.
A signiﬁcant literature has developed which addresses precisely this demand aggregation
issue; a result which ﬁgures prominently in this literature is a theorem developed indepen-
dently by Milleron (1974) and Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978) (henceforth to be referred
to as MMP). Let u : Rl
++ ! R be a utility function and let f : Rl
++ £ R++ ! Rl
++ be the
2demand function it generates; we say that f obeys monotonicity or the law of demand if at
any two distinct price vectors p and p0 in Rl
++, and wealth w > 0,
(p ¡ p0)T(f(p;w) ¡ f(p0;w)) < 0:
(Note that, crucially, while prices may vary, wealth is ﬁxed at w.) It is well known that
while this property is, in some precise sense, encouraged by substitution eﬀects, the pres-
ence of income eﬀects means that it does not follow from utility maximization alone. The
contribution of MMP is to identify precisely those conditions on u which guarantee that
substitution eﬀects always dominate income eﬀects, so that f is monotonic.2; 3
If u is the utility function deﬁned over contingent consumption in l states of the world,
it would be quite standard to assume that u has the expected utility form, i.e., u(x) =
Pl
i=1 ¼i¯ u(xi) where ¼i > 0 is the agent’s subjective probability of state i occurring and
¯ u : R++ ! R is the Bernoulli utility function. In this case, one could show that the
conditions of MMP are satisﬁed if the agent’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion does not
















The signiﬁcance of this result for general equilibrium theory has to do with the fact
that monotonicity is preserved by aggregation across agents, unlike the weak or strong
axioms, which generally are not. Consider a market where all agents have monotonic
demand functions (which can diﬀer across agents). Assume that each agent has some
wealth which is independent of price, and then consider a price change from p to p0. Each
agent’s demand will respond monotonically to this price change, and it is very clear that
3the aggregate demand of this market, F : Rl
++ ! Rl
++, will also be monotonic, i.e., satisfy
(p ¡ p0)T(F(p) ¡ F(p0)) < 0 whenever p 6= p0.
Of course, there is a serious problem when one tries to apply this result in a general
equilibrium model: with one signiﬁcant exception, the wealth distribution in the economy
will not be independent of price. The exception are exchange economies with collinear
endowments, i.e., where all agents have endowments that are some (scalar) fraction of the
aggregate endowment. In this case, a price change which preserves the value of aggregate en-
dowment, will also preserve the wealth of every agent. If all agents have monotonic demand
functions, then the economy’s aggregate demand will also obey a restricted version of this
property. Denoting the economy’s aggregate demand by ˜ F and the aggregate endowment
by ¯ ! in Rl
++, we have (p¡p0)T( ˜ F(p)¡ ˜ F(p0)) < 0 whenever p 6= p0 and pT ¯ ! = p0T ¯ !. One can
then use this to show that the economy’s excess demand function, Z, where Z(p) = ˜ F(p)¡¯ !,
will also obey a similar version of monotonicity and hence the weak axiom. So by making
an assumption which is stronger than the weak axiom at the individual level, one obtains
the weak axiom in the aggregate.5
Our discussion so far has focused on exchange economies. We now turn to two-period
ﬁnancial economies with possibly incomplete markets. There are two reasons why MMP-
type results are interesting in this context. Firstly, in this context, it is standard to assume
that agents maximize expected utility; with these utility functions, the MMP approach leads
to restrictions on the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion which can be easily interpreted.
Secondly, the MMP approach can be extended to incomplete markets with relative ease.
There is a natural analog to the complete markets result which can be obtained by a
4relatively modest tweaking of the assumptions and arguments made when markets are
complete. The behavioral restrictions on the agents, i.e., on their coeﬃcients of relative
risk aversion remain unchanged; two assumptions must now be made on endowments - that
they are collinear (as before) and that they are in the span of the asset space. Once these
are in place, the economy’s excess demand will obey the weak axiom.6
In the context of economies with collinear endowments, there are at least two papers
which have sought to go beyond the claims made in the previous paragraph. While retaining
the spanning assumption, Dana (1995) has extended the MMP results to inﬁnite dimensional
commodity spaces with possibly incomplete markets. In a ﬁnite dimensional context, the
spanning requirement has been weakened in Bettzuge (1998), which shows that a joint
restriction on the collinear endowments and the asset structure will suﬃce. In this paper
we have retained both the ﬁnite dimensional and spanning assumptions and devoted our
attention somewhere else.
We consider a ﬁnancial economy with incomplete markets and focus on the local prop-
erties of demand near a given equilibrium price. Using MMP-type arguments, we identify
conditions which guarantee that the economy’s excess demand function for securities will
obey the weak axiom near this equilibrium. Our local approach means that unlike other
papers using the MMP approach (like Dana (1995) and Bettzuge (1998)), we are not able to
address the issue of the global uniqueness of equilibrium. However, the local weak axiomatic
structure of the excess demand function obtained through our conditions is still important
because it guarantees the local stability of the equilibrium price and also the possibility of
nice, i.e., intuitive, local comparative statics.
5The major advantage of our approach is that we no longer require endowments to be
collinear. We take as given the distribution of demand and endowments at the equilibrium
price and ask what restrictions on agents’ risk attitudes will guarantee that the economy’s
excess demand function for securities will obey the weak axiom. We recover, as a special
case, the known result pertaining to collinear endowments; more generally, we show that
the less collinear is the endowment distribution relative to the demand distribution (in some
formal sense), the more stringent will be the conditions on agents’ coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a formal discussion of results per-
taining to the monotonicity of individual demand and also of various concepts central to the
MMP approach. The major result here is a ‘translation theorem’ that relates monotonicity
conditions given in terms of direct utility functions with those given in terms of indirect
utility functions. This is of great technical importance for us, since, following Quah (2000),
the approach taken in this paper makes central use of the indirect utility function. Indeed,
the conditions needed for our main results are ﬁrst obtained as conditions on agents’ indirect
utility functions, and are only then translated into conditions on direct utility functions via
the translation theorem. The main results of the paper, which pertain to the local weak
axiom in ﬁnancial economies, are presented in Section 3. This section also contains a com-
parison of the MMP approach to the aggregation problem that we have adopted in this
paper, with the other major approach which focuses on conditions leading to ‘increasing
dispersion’ (see Jerison (1999) for a survey and analysis of this approach).
62. The Monotonicity of Individual Demand for Securities 7
We assume that there are two dates, 0 and 1. There is one good for consumption at
date 0, and at date 1 there are l states of the world, with one good in each state. The
economy has m securities or assets, with m · l. The m £ l matrix D gives the payoﬀs of
these securities at date 1, with the ijth entry being the payoﬀ of the ith security in state
j. We assume that the rank of D is m, so there are no redundant securities.
We assume that the commodity space is Rl+1
++; for a typical bundle x = (x0;x1;x2;:::;xl),
the ﬁrst entry x0 represents consumption at date 0, while contingent consumption at date 1
is represented by the vector x¡0 = (x1;x2;:::;xl). A function u : Rl+1
++ ! R is a regular utility
function if it has the following properties: it is C2, its partial derivatives are strictly positive,
it is diﬀerentiably strictly quasi-concave, and the sets C¯ x = fx 2 Rl+1
++ : u(x) ¸ u(¯ x)g are
closed in Rl+1 for any ¯ x in Rl+1
++. We call a preference (more formally, a preorder) on Rl+1
++
regular if it is representable by a regular utility function.
We denote the set of arbitrage free security prices by Q0, which we know from standard
theory satisﬁes Q0 = fq0 2 Rm : q = Dp for some p 2 Rl
++g. In other words, Q0 is the set
of security price vectors implied by strictly positive state price vectors. It follows that Q0
is an open and convex cone in Rm. The contingent consumption implied by a portfolio of
securities µ in Rm is DTµ; we assume that there exists some portfolio µ such that DTµ À 0.
Consider an agent who, at date 0, has a regular preference º (represented by some regular
utility function u) over Rl+1
++. This agent chooses a portfolio of securities which maximizes his
utility, subject to the constraint implied by his wealth and the prevailing prices. We denote
his wealth by w > 0; the prices he faces is represented by some vector q = (q0;q1;:::;qm) in
7the set Q = R++ £Q0; so q0 is the price of the date 0 good, and q¡0 = (q1;q2;:::;qm) is the
vector of security prices. The agent is constrained to choose from his budget set; at wealth
w and price q, the set is
B(q;w) = fx 2 Rl
++ : x0 · (w ¡ µTq¡0)=q0 and x¡0 · DTµ for some µ 2 Rmg:
Since we assume that there is µ such that DTµ À 0, this set is nonempty for all (q;w) in
Q £ R++.
The regularity of u guarantees that there is a unique solution x¤ to the problem of
maximizing u(x) subject to x in B(q;w); since D is of rank m, the portfolio choice µ¤
required to achieve x¤ is also unique. We deﬁne the function g : Q £ R++ ! Rm+1 by
g(q;w)0 = x0
¤ and g(q;w)¡0 = µ¤. We shall refer to g(q;w) as the demand of the agent at
(q;w), with the ﬁrst entry representing his choice of consumption level at date 0 and the
other entries representing his chosen portfolio of securities. The regularity of u guarantees
that g obeys the budget identity, i.e., qTg(q;w) = w, and is C1.
The function g is said to obey monotonicity or the law of demand if for any (q;w) and
(q0;w) in Q £ R++, with q 6= q0, we have (q ¡ q0)T(g(q;w) ¡ g(q0;w)) < 0. In particular,
this property guarantees that when the price of security increases, its demand will fall. A
suﬃcient (and eﬀectively necessary) condition for monotonicity is that @qg(q;w) is negative
deﬁnite at all (q;w) in Q £ R++. By the Slutsky decomposition we can write @qg(q;w) as
the diﬀerence between the substitution and income eﬀect matrices; so long as g is generated
by utility maximization, the former is always negative semideﬁnite, but the presence of the
income eﬀect matrix means that @qg(q;w) is not generally negative deﬁnite. So additional
conditions on the utility function are needed to guarantee that substitution eﬀects dominate
8income eﬀects. We will discuss this next.
At each x in Rl+1
++, let U(x) be the collection of regular and concave utility functions
which represent º is some open and convex neighborhood of x. That º is representable
by a regular utility function is true by deﬁnition; less trivially, it is also true that local
representations which are both concave and regular exist, so that U(x) is always nonempty.8
For each ˆ u in U(x), we can compute




Following Quah (2003), we deﬁne the direct MMP coeﬃcient (or, for short, MMP coeﬃcient)




Since ˆ u is concave, Ãˆ u(x) ¸ 0, so Ãº(x) ¸ 0 for all x. It is possible for Ãº ´ 0; indeed, if º
is homothetic, it must be representable by a concave and 1-homogeneous utility function ˆ u
and one could check that Ãˆ u(x) = 0 for all x. The next result identiﬁes a condition on the
MMP coeﬃcient which is suﬃcient to guarantee that g obeys monotonicity. It is a fairly
straightforward adaptation, to a ﬁnancial setting with incomplete markets, of the original
monotonicity theorem due to Milleron (1974) and Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978).
Note that the matrix (m + 1) £ (l + 1) matrix ¯ D = (¯ dij)0·i;j·l referred to in the next
proposition has ¯ d00 = 1; ¯ d0j = ¯ di0 = 0 for all i and j, and ¯ dij = dij for all i;j ¸ 1.
We introduce it so that the consumption implied by g(q;w), which is g(q;w)0 at date 0
and contingent consumption of DTg(q;w)¡0) at date 1 can be more succinctly written as
¯ DTg(q;w).
9Proposition 2.1 (The MMP monotonicity theorem): Suppose that the demand function
g : Q £ R++ ! R++ £ Rm is generated by a regular preference º on Rl+1
++.
(i) If at some (q;w), we have Ãº( ¯ DTg(q;w)) < 4, then there exists an open neighborhood
N around q in which g is monotonic, i.e., (q0 ¡ q00)T(g(q0;w) ¡ g(q00;w)) < 0 whenever q0
and q00 are in N and q0 6= q00.
(ii) If Ãº(x) < 4 for all x in Rl+1
++, then g is a monotonic demand function.
As we had pointed out earlier, a homothetic preference will have an MMP coeﬃcient
which is identically zero, so we conclude that such a preference will generate a monotonic
demand function. Indeed when the preference is homothetic, it is not diﬃcult to prove
the monotonicity of g directly, using the fact that g is now linear in w (see Mas-Colell et
al (1995)). So we can view Proposition 2.1 as a far reaching generalization of the simple
observation that homothetic preferences give rise to monotonic demand functions.
The condition Ãº < 4 is not just suﬃcient for monotonicity - there is also a sense in
which it is necessary for monotonicity. In one form or another, this fact is well known
(see, for example, Mas-Colell (1991) and Quah (2003)). Quah (2003) also provides an
economic interpretation of Ãº which is valid for any regular preference º, but the special
attractiveness of the MMP coeﬃcient in the context of ﬁnancial decision making has to do
with the next result we present.




i > 0 and u00
i < 0 for i = 0;1;2;:::;l. In this case, one could impose a very useful
10bound on Ãº. Deﬁne the function Bu : Rl+1




















the next result can be found in Quah (2003).
Proposition 2.2: Suppose u is a regular and additive utility function deﬁned on
Rl+1
++,and let º be the preference over Rl
++ that it represents. Then for any x in Rl
++,
Ãº(x) · Bu(x).
In the context of ﬁnancial decision making, the assumption that u is additive is standard
and has sound axiomatic foundations. Indeed, it is commonplace to formulate u as






where ± represents the discount rate and ¼i > 0 the subjective probability of state i oc-
curring, so
Pl
i=1 ¼i = 1. In this case, Bu(x) is uniformly bounded by the variation in the
agent’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, i.e., for all x in Rl+1
++, Bu(x) · V¯ u, where















Proposition 2.2 is very useful: combining it with Proposition 2.1, we see that a regular
and additive utility function u will generate a monotonic demand function if Bu(x) < 4
for all x. More generally, imagine any theorem which includes a condition of the form
‘Ãº(x) < M’; if º is representable by a regular and additive utility function u, then the
claim of the theorem is still true if the condition ‘Ãº(x) < M’ is replaced by the condition
‘Bu(x) < M.’ Whether or not the latter condition is strong depends on the size of M, but
at least the economic interpretation on the condition, in terms of the agent’s coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion, is completely straightforward.
11There are other ways of formulating suﬃcient conditions for monotonicity besides using
the MMP coeﬃcient. In particular, conditions could be stated in terms of the indirect
preference. For any (p;w) in Rl+2
++, the regularity of º guarantees that there is a unique
bundle ˆ x in Rl+1
++ which satisﬁes the following conditions: pT ˆ x · w and ˆ x º x for all x
satisfying pTx · w. In other words, ˆ x is the demand at (p;w) in the classical sense, i.e., it
is the demand at (p;w) when markets are complete. We denote this by f(p;w) and will refer
to f as the classical demand function. The indirect preference induced (or generated) by
º refers to the preorder º0 deﬁned on (p;w) in Rl+1
++, such that (p;w) º0 (p0;w0) whenever
f(p;w) º f(p0;w0).
If u is a regular utility function representing º, then the induced indirect preference º0
is representable by the indirect utility function v : Rl+2
++ ! R, where v(p;w) = u(f(p;w)).
It is well known that the regularity of u will guarantee that v is a regular indirect utility
function; by this we mean that it has the following properties: it is homogeneous of degree
zero, it is C2, its partial derivative with respect to the price of any good is strictly negative,
and it is diﬀerentiably strictly quasiconvex in prices (see Mas-Colell (1985)). We call an
indirect preference on Rl+2
++ regular if it admits a regular indirect utility function. It follows
that a regular preference must generate a regular indirect preference.
We denote by V (p;w) the set of indirect utility functions which are both regular and
convex in prices and which represent º
0
in an open and convex neighborhood of (p;w). It
is known that for all (p;w) in Rl+2
++, the set V (p;w) is nonempty.9 For each ˆ v in V (p;w), we
may construct





12the indirect MMP coeﬃcient of º0 at (p;w), denoted by Áº




Note that Áº0 is always nonnegative. The next result gives us the relationship between Áº0
and Ãº.
Theorem 2.3 (The translation theorem): Let º0 be the indirect preference generated
by the regular (direct) preference º on Rl+1
++. Then Ãº(f(p;w)) = Áº0(p;w) for all (p;w)
in Rl+2
++.
This result is very useful since it allows us to translate conditions stated in terms of Ãº
into conditions stated in terms of Áº0 and vice versa. So for example, we conclude from this
theorem and Proposition 2.1 that the demand function g generated by º will be monotonic
if the indirect preference º0 obeys Áº0(p;w) < 4 for all (p;w) in Rl+2
++. In fact, the principal
use of Theorem 2.3 in this paper is in the opposite direction. All the results of the next two
sections are stated in terms of conditions on Ãº—we do this because direct preferences are
usually thought of as more familiar than indirect preferences and also (crucially) because
Ãº is bounded by Bu, which has a very straightforward interpretation—but an examination
of the proofs will reveal that the conditions in our results were originally imposed on Áº0
and translated into conditions on Ãº only at the ﬁnal step, using Theorem 2.3.
3. The Local Weak Axiom for Market Excess Demand
In this section we will examine the structure of demand near an equilibrium in a ﬁnancial
economy, which we will denote as F. As in Section 2, we assume that there are two dates, 0
and 1. At date 1 there are l states of the world, with one good in each state. The economy
13has m securities, with m · l. The m £ l matrix D gives the payoﬀs of these securities and
the rank of D is m. Note that the familiar complete markets exchange economy, which we
shall refer to as a classical exchange economy can be thought of as a ﬁnancial economy with
m = l and the payoﬀ matrix D = I.
The agents in F are drawn from a compact metric space of types, A. The distribution
of types in F is given by the Borel probability measure ¹ on A. To each type a is associated
an endowment !a in Rm+1, so !0
a represents type a’s endowment of the date 0 good while
!¡0
a in Rm is type a’s endowment of securities. We assume that the map from a to !a is
continuous. We also assume that !0
a ¸ 0 and DT!¡0
a ¸ 0, with either strictly positive. To
each a is also associated a C1 demand function ga : Q£R++ ! Rm+1 which is generated by
a regular preference ºa. We assume that the maps from (a;q;w) to ga(q;w) and @qga(q;w)
are continuous.
The agent in F derives his wealth from his endowment; we denote type a’s demand, as
a function of the security price vector by ˜ ga, i.e., ˜ ga(q) = ga(q;qT!a). Note that since q is
in Q, there is p À 0 such that q¡0 = Dp, so that, given our assumptions on !a, the agent’s
wealth at price q,
qT!a = q0!0
a + pT(DT!¡0
a ) > 0:
The mean demand function of F is G : Q ! Rm+1, given by G(q) =
R
A ˜ ga(q)d¹; this is
well-deﬁned and C1, with @qG(q) =
R
A @q˜ ga(q)d¹: The excess demand at price q in Q is
deﬁned as ³(q) = G(q) ¡ ¯ !, where ¯ ! =
R
a2A !ad¹ is the economy’s mean endowment. The
function ³ is C1, homogeneous of degree zero, and satisﬁes Walras’ Law, i.e., qT³(q) = 0 at
all q in Q. We assume that F has an equilibrium price at ¯ q, i.e., ³(¯ q) = 0.
14We wish to identify the conditions under which ³ obeys the weak axiom locally at ¯ q;
formally, this property requires that there be a neighborhood of ¯ q such that (q¡¯ q)T³(q) < 0
whenever q is in that neighborhood and ¯ q and q are not collinear. In particular, this implies
that a small rise in the price of i above ¯ qi leads to excess supply, and a small fall in the
price of i below ¯ qi leads to excess demand. A suﬃcient condition for the local weak axiom
is to require ³ to obey the diﬀerentiable weak axiom at ¯ q, by which we mean that @q³(¯ q) is
negative deﬁnite on the set ¯ q ? = fz 2 Rm+1 : zT ¯ q = 0g, i.e., zT@q³(¯ q)z < 0 for all z 6= 0 in
¯ q ?.
Our goal is to formulate a condition which guarantees the local weak axiom at ¯ q in
terms of the distribution of demand and endowments at that price and some bound on
agents’ MMP coeﬃcients. Put another way, we ﬁrst observe that at any given equilibrium
price, there are many ways demand and endowments can be distributed. For any given
distribution, we wish to determine the restrictions (if any) on the local behavior of demand,
as measured by the MMP coeﬃcients, which will guarantee that excess demand obeys
the local weak axiom. Potentially, the type of distributional information on demand and
endowments needed for the formulation of a sensible theorem could be complicated, or at
least complicated to state, but happily, it turns out that all the distributional information
required can be captured by a few properly constructed covariance matrices.
Firstly, by re-scaling ¯ q if necessary, we can assume that ¯ qT ¯ ! = 1. In other words, we
have normalized the equilibrium price vector so that the mean wealth is 1. We deﬁne a new
probability measure ˆ ¹ on A: for any measurable subset S of A, deﬁne ˆ ¹(S) =
R
S ¯ qT!ad¹.
The eﬀect of ˆ ¹ is to ‘re-weigh’ agents according to their contribution to average wealth at the
15equilibrium price ¯ q. For each a, we deﬁne ˆ ga(¯ q) by ˆ ga(¯ q) = ˜ ga(¯ q)=¯ qT!a. So ˆ ga(¯ q) is just the
projection of ˜ ga(¯ q) onto the mean endowment budget plane, B = fx 2 Rm+1 : ¯ qTx = ¯ qT ¯ !g.
Similarly we deﬁne ˆ !a = !a=¯ qT!a, the projection of !a onto B. In Figure 1, projected
demand bundles are depicted by squares, and projected endowments by circles. The dis-
tributional information we require is captured by the covariance matrices Cov(ˆ g(¯ q); ˆ g(¯ q)),
Cov(ˆ !; ˆ !) and Cov(ˆ g(¯ q); ˆ !), where all of them are computed with the probability measure
ˆ ¹.
To specify the local behavior of demand (as opposed to the position of each demand
bundle) we impose a condition on the agents’ MMP coeﬃcients. Recall that the consumption
(in Rl+1
++) implied by ˜ ga(¯ q) is ¯ DT˜ ga(¯ q); at that bundle, type a has an MMP coeﬃcient of
Ãºa( ¯ DT˜ ga(¯ q)). We denote
¯ Ã(¯ q) = sup
a2A
Ãºa( ¯ DT˜ ga(¯ q))
and will refer to ¯ Ã(¯ q) as the MMP bound. The next result, which is the main theorem of
this paper, gives a condition for the local weak axiom at ¯ q which involves the MMP bound
and the distribution of endowments and demand, as captured by the covariance matrices.
Theorem 3.1: Suppose that the economy F has a normalized equilibrium price at ¯ q.
Then ³ obeys the diﬀerentiable weak axiom at ¯ q whenever the matrix
L(¯ q) = ¡4[Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g) ¡ Cov(ˆ g; ˆ !)] + ¯ Ã(¯ q)Cov(ˆ g ¡ ˆ !; ˆ g ¡ ˆ !) (7)
is negative deﬁnite on the plane ¯ q ?.
(Note that the argument ¯ q has been dropped from ˆ g to save space. Note also that, if we so
wish, we can write Cov(ˆ g ¡ ˆ !; ˆ g ¡ ˆ !) as Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g) + Cov(ˆ !; ˆ !) ¡ 2Cov(ˆ g; ˆ !).)
16Theorem 3.1 gives suﬃcient conditions for ³ to satisfy the weak axiom at ¯ q in terms
of the distribution of projected demand and endowments (as measured by their covariance
matrices) and the local behavior of demand as measured by the MMP bound ¯ Ã(¯ q). We argue
that an examination of these conditions will show them to be reasonably mild, so that there
is indeed a sound foundation for assuming the local weak axiom at an equilibrium price.
Note ﬁrstly that the theorem contains the known result for collinear endowments as
a special case. If !a are collinear for all a, ˆ !a is identical for all a, so that L(¯ q) =
Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g)( ¯ Ã(¯ q) ¡ 4). Since the matrix Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g) is always positive semideﬁnite, the ma-
trix L(¯ q) will be negative semideﬁnite if ¯ Ã(¯ q) < 4 and it will be negative deﬁnite on the
plane orthogonal to ¯ q if Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g) is positive deﬁnite on that plane. More generally, the re-
striction implied by the negative deﬁniteness of L(¯ q) can be usefully broken into two parts.
Since Cov(ˆ g ¡ ˆ !; ˆ g ¡ ˆ !) is positive semideﬁnite and ¯ Ã(¯ q) ¸ 0, L(¯ q) can be negative deﬁnite
only if
(A) Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g) ¡ Cov(ˆ g; ˆ !) is positive deﬁnite on ¯ q ?.
Provided (A) is satisﬁed, L(¯ q) will be negative deﬁnite on ¯ q ? if
(B)
¯ Ã(¯ q) < min
fz2Rm: z6=0 and z ? ¯ qg
Var(zTˆ g;zTˆ g) ¡ Cov(zTˆ g;zT ˆ !)
Var(zT(ˆ g ¡ ˆ !);zT(ˆ g ¡ ˆ !))
:
Condition (A) guarantees that the right hand side of this inequality is strictly positive, so
there will always be some nonempty range of values for ¯ Ã(¯ q) which satisﬁes (B). In short,
it is clear that L(¯ q) is negative deﬁnite on ¯ q ? if and only if conditions (A) and (B) are
satisﬁed, so by Theorem 3.1, conditions (A) and (B) imply that ³ obeys the local weak axiom
at ¯ q. We now examine, in turn, the signiﬁcance of conditions (A) and (B).
17How restrictive is condition (A)? It is reasonable to say that it is a big improvement
over assuming collinear endowments; whether distributions of demand and endowments
actually satisfy the property is an empirical issue, but (unlike collinear endowments) it
is not prima facie implausible. The type of equilibrium situation which creates problems
for the aggregate weak axiom occurs when those agents who are relatively well endowed
with a particular commodity also tend to consume more of that commodity. It stands to
reason that this will cause problems: in this case, a rise in the price of the commodity will
raise the wealth of the greatest consumers of that commodity, which potentially negates
the tendency to substitute away from it. Condition (A) does not completely exclude the
possibility of positive correlation between demand and endowments, but it does require that
this phenomenon be, in a speciﬁc sense, smaller than the variance of demand.
Is condition (A) necessary? More speciﬁcally, we can ask the following: for any partic-
ular distribution of demand and endowments at equilibrium, is there some restriction on
¯ Ã(¯ q) which guarantees the local weak axiom? The answer to the second question is ‘no’, so
the answer to the ﬁrst is ‘yes.’ To understand this, ﬁrst note that the MMP coeﬃcient for
a homothetic preference is everywhere zero. The tightest possible restriction on ¯ Ã(¯ q) that
one could impose is to require it to be zero, but even then all homothetic preferences will be
admissible. So if it were the case that for any distribution of demand and endowments, some
restriction on agents’ MMP coeﬃcients is suﬃcient to guarantee the weak axiom, we will
in eﬀect be saying that so long as preferences are homothetic, the local weak axiom holds,
never mind how demand and endowments are distributed at equilibrium. Such a result
will run up against the indeterminacy theorem of Hens (2001), which says that the excess
18demand function of a ﬁnancial economy need not have any structure (and in particular need
not obey the weak axiom) even if all agents have homothetic preferences. (Hens’ result is
a generalization to ﬁnancial economies of the well known indeterminacy theorem of Mantel
(1976), which only applies to classical exchange economies.10) In short, when preferences
are homothetic, condition (B) is automatically satisﬁed so condition (A) is suﬃcient to
guarantee the local weak axiom. However, when condition (A) is violated, the Mantel-Hens
indeterminacy theorem tells us that local violations of the weak axiom can indeed occur
even if all preferences are homothetic.
We now turn to condition (B). When endowments are collinear, the bound on ¯ Ã(¯ q) is 4,
which, at least when interpreted as a restriction on the variation of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, seems very permissive. One would expect this restriction to be more stringent
when endowments are non-collinear. To have some sense of the magnitudes involved, it is
useful to have some way measuring the dispersion of demand relative to that of endowments.
We assume that Var(ˆ g; ˆ g) is positive deﬁnite on ¯ q?. This matrix is always positive
semideﬁnite, so to assume that it is positive deﬁnite is a very modest extension. With this as-
sumption, we know there must exist a nonnegative number µ such that µVar(ˆ g; ˆ g)¡Var(ˆ !; ˆ !)
is positive semideﬁnite on ¯ q?. Similarly, there must be nonnegative numbers K1 and K2
such that K2Var(ˆ g; ˆ g)¡Cov(ˆ g; ˆ !) and K1Var(ˆ g; ˆ g)+Cov(ˆ g; ˆ !) are positive semideﬁnite ma-
trices. We assume that µ, K1 and K2 are chosen to be the smallest nonnegative numbers for
which the conditions are satisﬁed. Clearly, a large µ will mean that the variance of demand
is small relative to the variance of endowment; K1 and K2 can be similarly interpreted.
Intuitively, we would expect that the larger are these coeﬃcients the more stringent will be
19the conditions on the MMP bound needed to guarantee the local weak axiom. This is borne
out by the following corollary which gives a list of conditions guaranteeing monotonicity. We
intersperse each condition with our comments. Note that distributional conditions imposed
in all four cases of the corollary satisfy condition (A).11
Corollary 3.2: Suppose that economy F has a normalized equilibrium price at ¯ q and
that Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g) is positive deﬁnite on ¯ q ?. Then ³ satisﬁes the diﬀerentiable local weak at ¯ q,
if any of the following situations hold.
(i) µ < 1 and ¯ Ã(¯ q) · 2.
Remark: Note that µ < 1 if and only if demand is more dispersed than endowments in the
sense of having a bigger variance, i.e., Var(ˆ g; ˆ g) ¡ Var(ˆ !; ˆ !) is positive deﬁnite on ¯ q ?. So
(i) can be re-phrased as saying that the local weak axiom at ¯ q is guaranteed if demand is
more dispersed than endowments and the MMP bound is less than 2. This provides a very
clean generalization of the known result that an MMP bound of 4 guarantees the local weak
axiom when endowments are collinear.
(ii) K1 = K2 = 0 and ¯ Ã(¯ q) < 4=(1 + µ).
Remark: We consider here a highly stylised (thought not completely unrealistic) scenario
in which the covariance of the endowment and demand distributions is zero. (Of course,
it is suﬃcient for this that endowments and demand are independently distributed.) This
brings into sharp relief the impact of µ on the MMP bound. Since 4=(1 + µ) is decreasing
in µ, the greater is the dispersion of endowment relative to demand, the more stringent is
the condition on the MMP bound needed for the weak axiom. When µ = 0 it equals 4 (as
expected), when µ = 1, it equals 2 (in agreement with (i)) and tends to zero as µ goes to
20inﬁnity. (Note that the MMP bound cannot, by deﬁnition, fall below zero.)
(iii) µ < 1 and ¯ Ã(¯ q) < 2(2 + 2K1)=(1 + µ + 2K1).
Remark: This is just a more reﬁned version of (i), which uses the precise values of µ and K1
to give a more permissive MMP bound: note that the bound on the MMP bound is now
larger than 2.
(iv) µ ¸ 1, K2 < 1, and ¯ Ã(¯ q) < 4(1 ¡ K2)=[(µ ¡ 1) + 2(1 ¡ K2)]:
Remark: This concerns the case where demand is less dispersed than endowments (so µ ¸ 1)
and where the covariance between demand and endowments is not too great (in the sense
that K2 < 1). The condition on the MMP bound (it is now lower than 2) is tighter than
in (i) and (iii), as one would expect. The condition becomes more stringent as K2 or µ
increases, and in fact it tends to zero as µ tends to inﬁnity or K2 tends to 1 from below.
Suppose that each for each type a in the economy, ºa is representable by a utility
function of the form





where ±a represents type a’s discount rate and ¼ai is a’s subjective probability of state
i occurring, so
Pl
i=1 ¼ai = 1. As we had pointed out in the Section 2, type a’s MMP
coeﬃcient is then uniformly bounded by the variation in the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion; formally, Ãºa · V¯ ua, with the latter as deﬁned by (4). Thus Theorem 3.1 and
Corollary 3.2 will still be true if supa2A V¯ ua were to replace ¯ Ã(¯ q). In other words, it suﬃces
to impose bounds on the variation in the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for all agent
types in the economy. For example, Corollary 3.2(i) will say that when demand is more
21dispersed than endowments, the local weak axiom holds if, for each agent type, the variation
in the agent’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is smaller than 2. It is worth pointing out
the obvious here: we are not imposing a bound on the variation of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion across agents, but rather a bound on the variation for each agent. So one
agent type can have a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion between 5 and 7, another between
15 and 17, etc.
Relationship with the increasing dispersion approach to the aggregation problem
Finally, we wish to relate the approach to the aggregation problem adopted in this paper
with the other approach commonly used to deal with this issue. The approach adopted in
this paper - via the MMP coeﬃcient - has sometimes been referred to as the “dominating
substitution eﬀects” approach (see Mas-Colell (1991)). This is an apt description, since by
controlling an agent’s MMP coeﬃcient we are controlling the degree to which his substitu-
tion eﬀects dominate his income eﬀects. The contribution of this paper is to determine, in
an economy with non-collinear endowments, a precise bound on agents’ MMP coeﬃcients
which is suﬃcient to guarantee that, following any small price change from the equilib-
rium price, the substitution eﬀects which arise across all agents dominate, on average, the
corresponding income eﬀects.
There is another approach to the aggregation problem which focuses, not on getting
substitution eﬀects to dominate income eﬀects, but on getting average income eﬀects to
be well-behaved. To put it in diﬀerentiable terms, since the substitution eﬀect matrix of
each agent in the economy is always negative semideﬁnite, a suﬃcient condition for the
22excess demand function to satisfy the diﬀerentiable weak axiom at some equilibrium price
is for the average of income eﬀect matrices at that price to be positive deﬁnite. As pointed
out in Jerison (1999), what is needed for this property to hold is increasing dispersion: in
exchange economies this means that if all agents were to receive a little more income (while
holding prices ﬁxed), the distribution of their excess demand will have a greater variance
than before. Thus in this approach, either directly or indirectly, conditions are imposed on
the collective behavior of agents’ income expansion paths.
We wish to demonstrate that the MMP approach is distinct from the increasing dis-
persion approach to the aggregation problem. To do this, we show with an example that
a bound on the MMP coeﬃcient of an agent imposes no restriction on the direction of his
income expansion path, so that any positive bound on the MMP coeﬃcients for all agents
in the economy cannot imply the increasing dispersion property.
Consider the utility function u(x) =
Pl
i=0 ki(xi ¡bi)µ where k = (k0;k1;:::;kl) À 0 and
b = (b0;b1;:::;bl) À 0. Assume that markets are complete and that D = I. Suppose that
at some price ˆ p and income 1, the demand is ˆ x, where ˆ pT ˆ x = 1. So long as ˆ x À b, this
can always be arranged: by the ﬁrst order conditions, we need only choose ki to satisfy
kiµ(ˆ xi ¡ bi)µ¡1 = ¸ˆ pi where ¸ is the Langrange multiplier. With k chosen as such, locally
at ˆ x, the income expansion path is in the direction of ˆ x ¡ b, which could be any positive
direction since b can take on any values provided ˆ x À b. Turning to the MMP coeﬃcient,
Ãu(ˆ x) =
P
µ(1 ¡ µ)ki(ˆ xi)2(ˆ xi ¡ bi)µ¡2
P
µˆ xiki(ˆ xi ¡ bi)µ¡1
=
P
(1 ¡ µ)(ˆ xi)2(ˆ xi ¡ bi)¡1ˆ pi
P
ˆ piˆ xi
23= (1 ¡ µ)
X (ˆ xi)2ˆ pi
(ˆ xi ¡ bi)
;
which will be arbitrarily close to zero when µ is suﬃciently close to 1. Geometrically, as µ
increases to one and Ãu(ˆ x) approaches zero, the indiﬀerence surface around ˆ x ﬂattens.
So we see that a bound on this agent’s MMP coeﬃcient, however close to zero, is
compatible with an income expansion path in any positive direction. This means that one
can easily construct a classical exchange economy where, at an equilibrium price, agents
have income expansion paths which violate the dispersion property, and yet the economy
has an MMP bound which is small enough to ensure that its excess demand function satisﬁes
the diﬀerentiable local weak axiom.
Note that the opposite is also true. Consider a classical exchange economy with collinear
endowments. The MMP approach says that an MMP bound of 4 will guarantee monotonic-
ity for individual demand and hence the aggregate weak axiom for excess demand. In this
approach, agents need not have the same preference, but the preference of every agent
must satisfy the bound on the MMP coeﬃcient. The increasing dispersion approach gives
alternative conditions for the weak axiom in such an economy. An early and inﬂuential
paper using this approach is Hildenbrand (1983). The paper assumes that all agents share
the same demand function generated by some regular preference. It shows that when en-
dowments are collinear and has a distribution represented by a downward sloping density
function, then the average of income eﬀects will be positive semideﬁnite. Such an economy
will have an average (or mean) excess demand function which obeys the weak axiom, even
though the preference need not generate a monotonic individual demand function and the
24MMP coeﬃcient of the preference need not be bounded above by 4 or any other number.
So the MMP approach employed in this paper, and the increasing dispersion approach
are two distinct approaches to the aggregation problem. Of course, this is not the same
as saying that the (loosely speaking) ‘regularizing’ eﬀects of both approaches could not be
operating in the same setting to give some weak axiom-type structure to aggregate demand
or excess demand. Indeed, in the context of classical exchange economies with collinear
endowments, Quah (2000) has shown how both approaches may work in combination. In
the context of economies with non-collinear endowments, it remains to be seen that a hybrid
approach to the aggregation problem will lead to interesting results.
Appendix
The proof of Proposition 2.1 relies on the following lemma, which relates g with the
classical demand function f. Though it is not always stated in the form presented here, the
result is well known so we will skip the proof (see, for example, Magill and Quinzii (1996)).
Lemma A: Let º be a regular preference generating the demand function g. There is a
C1 function P : Q ! Rl+1
++ such that ¯ DTg(q;w) = f(P(q);w) and ¯ DP(q) = q
Proof of Proposition 2.1: The original MMP monotonicity result was set in a complete
markets context, i.e., they identify conditions which guarantee the monotonicity of the
classical demand function f. This proposition is just an extension of the MMP result to
the function g. Our proof will rely on the original MMP result and also on Lemma A, with
the latter allowing us to ‘move’ between g and f.
(i) By Lemma A, ¯ DTg(q;w) = f(P(q);w). It is known that when Ãº( ¯ DTg(q;w)) =
25Ãº(f(P(q);w)) < 4, there is an open and convex neighborhood N of P(q) such that for any
distinct p0 and p00 in N, we have (p0¡p00)T(f(p0;w)¡f(p00;w)) < 0 (see Mas-Colell (1991) and
Quah (2003)). Lemma A tells us that P is C1, so in particular it is continuous and there is
an open and convex neighborhood M of q such that whenever q0 is in M, P(q0) is in N. So if
q0 and q00 are distinct prices in M, we have (P(q0)¡P(q00))T(f(P(q0);w)¡f(P(q00);w)) < 0.
Substituting ¯ DTg(q0;w) = f(P(q0);w) and ¯ DTg(q00;w) = f(P(q00);w) into this inequality
tells us that (q0 ¡ q00)T(g(q0;w) ¡ g(q00;w)) < 0.
(ii) By Lemma A, we have
(q0 ¡ q00)T(g(q0;w) ¡ g(q00;w)) = (P(q0) ¡ P(q00))T(f(P(q0);w) ¡ f(P(q00);w)):
The latter will be less than zero if q0 and q00 (and hence P(q0) and P(q00)) are distinct and
Ãº(x) < 4 for all x (see Mas-Colell (1991) and Quah (2003)). QED
The proof of Theorem 2.3 requires the following lemma.
Lemma B: Let u be a regular utility function that generates a regular indirect utility
function v. (i) If u is locally concave at x¤ = f(p¤;1), then Áv(p¤;1) · 2. Conversely, if
Áv(p¤;1) < 2, then u is locally concave at x¤ = f(p¤;1). (ii) If v is locally convex in prices
at (p¤;1), then Ãu(f(p¤;1)) · 2. Conversely, if Ãu(f(p¤;1)) < 2, then v is locally convex in
prices at x¤ = f(p¤;1).
Proof: See and adapt the proof of Proposition 2.4 in Quah (2000).
Proof of Theorem 2.3: Without loss of generality, we may assume that w = 1.
We will show that at p = p¤, we have Ãº
0(f(p¤;1)) ¸ Áº(p¤;1). The proof of the other
direction is analogous. Let u be a locally concave and regular representation of º
0
. Using
a linear transformation on u if necessary, we could guarantee that @xu(x¤)x¤ = 1, where
26x¤ = f(p¤;1). The function ˜ u = h ± u, where h is increasing, satisﬁes












= M0 ¡2, with M0 greater than M, we
ﬁnd that Ã˜ u(x¤) < 2. By Lemma B(ii), ˜ v = h±v, the indirect utility generated by ˜ u is convex
in prices in a neighborhood of (p¤;1). Note that ¡@pv(p¤;1)p¤ = vw(p¤;1) = @xu(x¤)x¤ = 1,
and that Áv(p¤;1) · 2, the latter following from the concavity of u (by Lemma B(i)).
Therefore





@pv(p¤;1)p¤ + Áv(p¤;1) · M0:
Since M0 could be chosen to be arbitrarily close to M, we obtain Ãº
0(f(p¤;1)) ¸ Áº(p¤;1).
QED
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is quite elaborate, so it is best that we break it up into a few
more manageable lemmas. Let v : Rl+2





Since vw is the marginal utility of wealth, ²v is the wealth elasticity of the marginal utility
of wealth. The relationship between Áv(p;w) and ²v(p;w) is given in the next lemma. (This
result can also be found in Quah (2000) but we reproduce it here for completeness.)
Lemma C: For any regular indirect utility function v : Rl+2
++ ! R,
Áv(p;w) = 2 + ²v(p;w): (9)
27Proof: Since v is zero-homogeneous, the denominator of Áv(p;w), which is @pv(p;w)p
(see (5)), equals ¡vw(p;w) (by Euler’s identity). The numerator of the Áv(p;w) formula,
which is ¡pT@2
pv(p;w)p, can also be re-written in terms of vw and vww. Since @v=@pi is




















Using Euler’s identity again, we see that the ﬁrst sum on the right equals wvw and the
second sum equals wvw + w2vww. So we obtain (9). QED
The next lemma is the central technical result of this paper because it links type a’s
indirect MMP coeﬃcient, Áº0
a, with @q˜ ga. The proof makes crucial use of Roy’s identity.
Lemma D: Suppose that there is an open and convex neighborhood Na of (q;qT!a) in
which ga is generated by a regular indirect preference º0
a. Then for any z 2 Rm+1,


















Proof: To simplify notation, we will drop the subscript a. Since ˜ g(q) = g(q;qT!), we
have
@q˜ g(q) = @qg(q;qT!) + @wg(q;qT!)!T (11)
28Our ﬁrst objective is to show that for any z in Rm+1, and denoting the vector @qP(q)z in
Rl+1 by ˆ z, we have




ˆ zT( ¯ DT!)
i
: (12)
By Lemma A, q = ¯ DP(q); diﬀerentiating this with respect to q we obtain I = ¯ D@qP(q).
So the matrix @qP(q) is a right inverse of ¯ D. Diﬀerentiating the identity ¯ DTg(q;w) =
f(P(q);w) with respect to q we obtain
¯ DT@qg(q;w) = @pf(P(q);w)@qP(q): (13)
If we pre-multiply ¯ DT@qg(q;w) by ˆ zT = (@qP(q)z)T and post-multiply it by z, we obtain
z@qg(q;w)z so we conclude that
zT@qg(q;w)z = (@qP(q)z)T@pf(P(q);w)(@qP(q)z) = ˆ zT@pf(P(q);w)ˆ z: (14)
Since g is zero-homogeneous, @qg(q;w)q = ¡w@wg(q;w). Similarly, because the map from
(q;w) to ¯ DTg(q;w) = f(P(q);w) is zero-homogeneous, @pf(P(q);w)@qP(q)q = ¡w@wf(P(q);w).
Post-multiplying (13) by q, we obtain ¯ DT@wg(q;w) = @wf(P(q);w). Since @qP(q)T is the
left inverse of ¯ DT, pre-multiplying this equation by zT@qP(q)T gives us
zT@wg(P(q);w) = (@qP(q)z)T@wf(P(q);w) = ˆ zT@wf(P(q);w): (15)
Equations (11), (14) and (15), with w = qT! will give us (12).
Suppose that g is generated by the direct preference º, which has º0 as its associated
indirect preference. Let v be an indirect utility function which represents º0 in some open
neighborhood of (p;pTµ), We will now show that for any vector ˆ z in Rl+1,
















[ˆ zT(f(p;pTµ) ¡ µ)]2
pTµ
:
By making the substitutions ˆ z = @qP(q)z, p = P(q), ¯ DP(q) = q, µ = ¯ DT!, and f(P(q);( ¯ DT!)TP(q)) =
¯ Dg(q;qT!) in (16), and replacing the left hand side by 4zT˜ g(q)z (which we can do by (12)),
we obtain














By the deﬁnition of Á, we may replace Áv(P(q);qT!), with Áº0
a(P(q);qT!) and so obtain
(10).
It remains for us to proof (16). By Roy’s identity, f(p;w) = ¡@pv(p;w)T=vw(p;w).
















(Note that we have omitted the arguments to save space.) Diﬀerentiating Roy’s identity













Combining (17) and (18) and using Roy’s identity again, we see that
























Using Lemma C and denoting s = zT(f + µ)=w, the right hand of this equation could be


















































Substituting pTµ for w, re-substituting ˆ zT(f + µ)=w for s, and re-arranging the terms in
this expression, we obtain (16). QED
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Note that by Theorem 2.3, we may replace Áº0
a(P(q);qT!a)
in (10) with Ãºa( ¯ DT˜ g(q)). Furthermore, at the equilibrium price ¯ q, we may replace
Ãºa( ¯ DT˜ g(¯ q)) with ¯ Ã(¯ q) since the latter is greater than the former by deﬁnition. Making
this replacement and then aggregating the inequality over A, we obtain





















Recall that the equilibrium price ¯ q was normalized to satisfy ¯ qT ¯ ! = 1. Recall also the








(zTˆ ga(¯ q))2dˆ ¹;
a similar transformation can be made to the other integrals on the right hand side of (19).
This gives us
4zT@q³(¯ q)z · ¡4
·Z
A
(zTˆ ga(¯ q))2dˆ ¹ ¡
Z
A
(zT ˆ !a)(zTˆ ga(¯ q))dˆ ¹
¸




zT(ˆ ga(q) ¡ ˆ !a)
i2
dˆ ¹: (20)
Since ¯ q is the equilibrium price,
Z
A









zT ˆ !adˆ ¹:
31It follows that the right hand side of (20) equals
¡4
h
Var(zTˆ g;zTˆ g) ¡ Cov(zTˆ g;zT ˆ !)
i
+ ¯ Ã(¯ q)Var(zT(ˆ g ¡ ˆ !);zT(ˆ g ¡ ˆ !));
which is zTL(¯ q)z. It follows that if L(¯ q) is negative deﬁnite on ¯ q ?, so is @q³(¯ q). QED
Proof of Corollary 3.2: By Theorem 3.1, we need only show that the conditions in (i)
to (iv) all lead to L(¯ q) being negative deﬁnite on ¯ q ?. For (i), we re-write
L(¯ q) = ¡2[Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g) ¡ Cov(ˆ !; ˆ !)] + ( ¯ Ã(¯ q) ¡ 2)Cov(ˆ g ¡ ˆ !; ˆ g ¡ ˆ !): (21)
If µ < 1, Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g)¡Cov(ˆ !; ˆ !) is positive deﬁnite on ¯ q ? while Cov(ˆ g ¡ ˆ !; ˆ g ¡ ˆ !) is positive
semideﬁnite, so L(¯ q) is negative deﬁnite on ¯ q ? if ¯ Ã(¯ q) · 2.
For (ii) to (iv), it useful to re-write
L(¯ q) =
¡
¡4 + ¯ Ã(¯ q)
¢
Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g) ¡ 2( ¯ Ã(¯ q) ¡ 2)Cov(ˆ g; ˆ !) + ¯ Ã(¯ q)Cov(ˆ !; ˆ !): (22)
If K1 = K2 = 0, for z 6= 0 in ¯ q ?,
zTL(¯ q)z · (¡4 + ¯ Ã(¯ q))Var(zTˆ g;zTˆ g) + ¯ Ã(¯ q)µVar(zTˆ g;zTˆ g):
The right hand side is negative if ¯ Ã(¯ q) < 4=(1 + µ). So we have shown (ii). The proofs for
(iii) and (iv) are similar. QED
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34Footnotes
1. For a textbook reference to all the claims in this paragraph see Mas-Colell et al
(1995). On comparative statics, some recent results which make use of a weak axiomatic
structure on the excess demand function can be found in Nachbar (2002, 2004) and Quah
(2003); Quah (2003) also has a discussion of comparative statics in a ﬁnancial economy.
2. Milleron’s paper is in French and never published, while the paper of Mitjuschin
and Polterovich is in Russian. English language versions of their theorem can be found in
Mas-Colell (1991) and Quah (2000, 2003), amongst other places. These English language
versions repeat (or adapt) the proof used by Mitjuschin and Polterovich rather than the
proof of Milleron.
3. For an alternative characterization of monotonicity using the normalized gradient
function see Kannai (1989).
4. The usual (and perhaps better known) application of the MMP monotonicity theorem
says that an upper bound of 4 on the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is suﬃcient to
guarantee monotonicity (see, for example, Mas-Colell (1991), Dana (1995) and Bettzuge
(1998)). The subtler result here is from Quah (2003).
5. For the claims in this paragraph, see Mas-Colell (1991) or Mas-Colell et al (1995).
6. When markets are complete and agents maximize expected utility, there is a result
which says that market excess demand obeys gross substitutability (and hence all the other
nice properties which ﬂow from it (see Mas-Colell et al (1995)) if all agents have coeﬃcients
of relative risk aversion which are bounded above by one (see Mas-Colell (1991) or Hens and
Loﬄer (1995)). Note that this is an upper (and quite stringent) bound on the coeﬃcient of
35relative risk aversion, unlike the MMP condition which is a bound on the coeﬃcient’s vari-
ation across income. Nonetheless, this result is very nice because it requires no substantial
assumptions on agents’ endowments. Unfortunately, this result does not extend easily to
incomplete markets. (See also Hens and Pilgrim (2002) for an extensive discussion of gross
substitutability and related concepts in ﬁnancial economies.)
7. The formulation of a ﬁnancial economy in this section and the next is broadly along
standard lines. See Magill and Quinzii (1996) for a textbook introduction.
8. This claim is rather misleading only because the truth is considerably stronger (see
Mas-Colell (1985)).
9. Once again, see Mas-Colell (1985). The results there pertain to the existence of
concave utility representations for regular (direct) preferences, but it is clear they also
apply, mutatis mutandi, to the representation of regular indirect preferences by indirect
utility functions which are convex in prices.
10. The rationalizing economy constructed in Hens’ indeterminacy theorem have agents
with homothetic preferences and also, as in the model considered here, endowments which
are in the asset span.
11. This is explicit in (ii) and (iv) where it is assumed that K2 < 1. In (i) and (iii), we
assume that Cov(ˆ g; ˆ g)¡Cov(ˆ !; ˆ !) is positive deﬁnite on ¯ q ?, which implies (A); we can see
this by expanding the positive semideﬁnite matrix Covˆ g ¡ ˆ !; ˆ g ¡ ˆ !).
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